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HOW TO WIN CITES AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE
J. M. BALKIN* AND SANFORD LEVINSON**
INTRODUCTION: THE ECOLOGY OF CITATION-IT'S A JUNGLE
OUT THERE
By now, Fred Shapiro can lay claim to be the founding father of a
new and peculiar discipline: "legal citology." Citology, the study of
citations, should not be confused with "cytology," which is the biologi-
cal study of cells. Legal citology is the systematic study of the citation
practices of those professors, research assistants, and law review edi-
tors who produce articles in journals widely circulated in the legal
academy. Of course other people-judges, politicians, journalists, and
even ordinary citizens writing letters to the editor-may occasionally
cite law journal articles. Yet, unsurprisingly, academics are most in-
terested in citations by people like themselves, who publish primarily
in academic journals. So we're confident that Shapiro's new article
will, like its predecessor,' be avidly read (and gossiped about) by
members of the legal academy. More than a few of us will be eager to
discover who ranks where and to speculate, with mixed tones of admi-
ration, envy, and outright rancor, about the justice of whatever kudos
are signified by high citation counts.
We mean no disrespect when we suggest that Shapiro's enterprise
has important connections to what has come to be called "garbology,"
the social scientific study of forms of social detritus, especially that
found in trash cans. Both citations and thrown-away objects provide
entryways into people's lives and the larger culture in which they live
and by which they are shaped. And we are not ones to take what is
condemned to the margins-whether footnotes or garbage-lightly.2
A piece of garbage, like a citation, is a sign or trace of previous cul-
tural trends and influences. Like the garbologist, the student of legal
citations receives a highly skewed and idiosyncratic perspective on the
culture being studied. Even so, the wealth of information Shapiro
* Lafayette S. Foster Professor, Yale Law School
** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr., Centenial Chair of Law, University
of Texas School of Law. Our thanks to Akhil Reed Amar and Carol Rose for their thoughtful
comments on previous drafts.
1. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540 (1985).
2. See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275 (1989) (shameless attempt
by author to raise citation count for this piece) (see infra Maxim Seven).
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presents suggests a host of questions about our legal culture, many of
which he himself addresses.
Many legal academics will, for a variety of reasons, be fascinated
with who is and is not on Shapiro's lists. No doubt one reason for this
fascination is the sense that one's status is improved by being on such
a list. Of course, most people will be quick to assert that there is no
necessary connection between high quality and high citation counts.
3
Each of us undoubtedly can readily identify at least one article on the
list that we find deficient in one or another measure of quality. To
take only one example, we could easily cite a hundred articles better
crafted and reasoned than Robert Bork's Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems,4 which is apparently the seventh most-
cited law review article of all time.5 Yet no matter how eagerly we
disavow belief in a correlation between citation rates and quality, our
fascination with these lists remains, for strength of citation counts
surely bears some connection to a scholar's importance and influence.
All law professors, no matter how famous, feel underappreciated, and
hence all are interested in the most concrete symbols of appreciation.
In fact, our inability to resist the lure of citation counts suggests
that the relation (or nonrelation) between citation counts and aca-
demic quality is more complicated than it first appears. More disturb-
ingly, it suggests that our notions of quality are not fully separable
from notions of influence, not because influence necessarily follows
quality as its just reward, but because disproportionate influence con-
structs our very notions of what good quality scholarship is.
As Barbara Herrnstein Smith has noted, "the repeated inclusion
of a particular work in anthologies" or "its frequent citation or quota-
tion by professors [and] scholars" is more than a simple repetition.
6 It
is a "recommendation of value" that "not only promotes but goes
some distance toward creating the value of that work."' 7 Citations and
quotations not only draw attention to works, they make works the
kinds of works that attention is paid to and hence should be paid to.
8
"[B]y making the work more likely to be experienced at all," citations
3. See, e.g., Fred R. Shapiro, The Most Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 751 (1996) (explicitly disclaiming such a connection).
4. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J.
1 (1971).
5. See Shapiro, supra note 3, at 767. Indeed, we think we could produce at least fifty such
examples even if we were confined to producing a list of conservative articles whose conclusions
we disagree with at least as much as those of Judge Bork.
6. BARBARA HERRNSTEIN SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE 10 (1988).
7. Id. (emphasis omitted).
8. Id.
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and quotations "make it more likely to be experienced as valuable." 9
"In this sense," Herrnstein Smith concludes, "value creates value."'10
Moreover, much-repeated works not only gain status from their
constant repetition, they also start to affect the very environment in
which they are reproduced, like a particularly successful biological
species." Space in the minds of academics, or even a community of
academics, is a limited and valuable resource. 12 By gaining an increas-
ing presence in that space, the canonical work may create an increas-
ingly hospitable environment for its own reproduction in the minds of
future academics, whose own minds are constructed and stocked
through cultural transmission from their colleagues and elders. In this
way, "the canonical work begins increasingly not merely to survive
within but to shape and create the culture in which its value is pro-
duced and transmitted and, for that very reason, to perpetuate the
conditions of its own flourishing.' 13
Thus, citation practices are a sort of economy of communication
and exchange between academics, or, to return again to biological
metaphors, an ecology of reproduction and hence competition with
other citations. Moreover, this economy or ecology has important dis-
ciplinary effects. By creating and recreating expectations about what
one should cite and not cite, about what one should discuss and not
discuss, the economy of citations normalizes certain practices of
thought and action and makes others deviant.' 4 The economy of cita-
tions confirms and establishes the types of articles and subject matters
that produce higher citation counts and greater academic attention,
with all that goes with such attention. Thus, the decision to write
about mortgage lien priorities rather than knotty issues of economic
efficiency or constitutional interpretation already marks one as a cer-
tain kind of scholar, who presumably accepts a particular place in the
great chain of academic status and presumably has insufficient desire
to become well known or move "up" in the pecking order of the con-
temporary theory-intoxicated legal academy.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Suggesting another possible connection between citology and cytology.
12. See DANIEL C. DENNETr, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA 349 (1995).
13. SMrrIH, supra note 6, at 50 (emphasis omitted).
14. For example, both LINO GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE (1976) and Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), stand for the proposition that the
Constitution, correctly interpreted, is colorblind. But if one simply cited the former and ignored
the latter in a law review article, there would be some doubt as to whether one really knew how
to play the academic game.
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Hence, citation counts are worrisome not because they are trivial
and divert our attention from the real issues of merit. Rather, they
are worrisome precisely because they may be quite important-be-
cause fascination with citations counts suggests that our very ideas of
merit may have been infected with and even constituted by relations
of social power. 15
We had planned to write an entire essay along these lines, duti-
fully showing how academic conceptions of merit were constructed by
the economy of citation and offering helpful suggestions on how to
reform our current practices. But, after discussing the issue between
ourselves for several weeks, we gradually realized that most readers of
this Symposium probably couldn't care less about our views on these
weighty theoretical matters. What most readers really want to know is
who's made the all-star team in the law professor game and how they
can get there themselves.' 6
Hence, after a long period of contemplation, we decided upon an
entirely different approach. After studying Shapiro's list carefully, we
concluded that the best way to discuss his findings was not through the
moralistic lens of ideology critique or the aloof aesthetic of the sociol-
ogy of knowledge, but through a more central and influential genre of
American popular culture: the self-help book.
As many of our readers are aware, we consider ourselves devoted
students of American popular culture.17 It can hardly be doubted that
the self-help book is a distinctive and long-lasting genre of American
15. It is important to understand that acknowledging this worry is not to engage in cultural
relativism. Quite the contrary: If merit were simply the product of forces of social power in a
particular community, then the most influential would be the most meritorious almost by defini-
tion. To worry about their possible disjunction would simply be neurotic. Rather, we insist, to
acknowledge this worry is already to believe in the possibility of a merit that is not merely the
product of a set of scholarly conventions and the social power created and maintained by them.
It is to believe in the possibility of a merit that truly merits the merit it possesses in the minds
and hearts of a community of scholars, and to worry that meritorious work is often insufficiently
recognized or otherwise badly used by the particular constellation of forces that constitutes that
community of scholars. We can find this attitude expressed implicitly even in fields like litera-
ture where postmodernist approaches currently reign. A standard rhetorical move is to "dis-
cover" some ignored work from the past and to claim that it in fact has more merit than many far
more famous and familiar works.
16. Similar questions (and anxieties) are probably raised by the preparation of the list of
"most prolific" scholars over the past several years that appears in the same issue of this journal.
See James Lindgren & Daniel Seltzer, The Most Prolific Law Professors and Faculties, 71 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 781 (1996).
17. For Professor Levinson's interest in letters-to-the-editor and bumper stickers as aids to
constitutional interpretation, see Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99
YALE L.J. 637, 650, 656-57, 657 n.95 (1989); for Professor Balkin's television watching habits, see
J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 105 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937-
42 (1995); for both scholars' expertise concerning Marion Brando's acting style, Bert Parks, the
Miss America Pageant, and cheap but tasty Tex-Mex restaurants, see Sanford Levinson & J.M.
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popular literature, as ubiquitous as the hot dog and as American as
apple pie. In its myriad forms, the self-help book offers strategies for
self-improvement in all of the various aspects of human endeavor,
ranging from advice on effective marketing and selling of products, to
office stratagems, tricks for more effective use of one's time, programs
of aerobic training, dietary tips, strategies for creating and preserving
relationships, and twelve-step programs to build a more positive atti-
tude and attractive self-image.
Although Americans have particularly excelled at the publication
of self-help literature, examples of the genre have appeared in many
different times and places. They range from Sun-Tzu's The Art of
War,18 a Taoist-inspired military treatise dating from the third century
B.C.E., to Niccolo Machievelli's The Prince,19 itself merely the most
famous of an entire genre of contemporary treatises of advice offered
to powerful (and now dead) white European noblemen.20 Although
these illustrious predecessors of the American self-help book are gen-
erally concerned with affairs of state, one can even find works offering
suggestions on the delicacies of personal behavior and advancement,
of which the most famous is probably the Jesuit priest Balthasar
Gracian's The Art of Worldly Wisdom, dating from 1637.21
American contributions to the self-help genre have tended to em-
brace a philosophy that goes beyond mere strategizing and empha-
sizes relentless self-improvement, both of the body and the spirit.
Success is not simply a matter of having an effective strategy-it is a
matter of becoming a better person. One improves one's prospects by
improving one's character. Thus, in the standard American version of
the self-help book, the way to get ahead is not simply to manipulate
the situation, but to manipulate the self. Borrowing a line from
Michel Foucault, one can see in the American self-help genre a dis-
tinctive set of "techniques of the self,"22 in which the self is recreated
through the achievement of ever new disciplines of the body and
mind, disciplines that miraculously transform the undeserving into the
deserving. In this tradition fall such masterpieces as Benjamin Frank-
Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 39 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1633, 1639-40, 1640
n.166 (1991).
18. SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR (Thomas Cleary trans., 1988).
19. 1 NiccoLt MACHIAVELLI, The Prince, in MACHIAVELLI 5-96 (Allan Gilbert trans.,
1965).
20. See QUENTIN SKINNER, MACHIAVELLI 34 (Keith Thomas ed., 1981).
21. BALmHASAR GRACIAN, THE ART OF WORLDLY WISDOM (Joseph Jacobs trans., 1993).
22. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE USE OF PLEASURE, 2 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1985).
See also infra text accompanying note 93 (impression management through citation practices).
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lin's Autobiography,23 Norman Vincent Peale's The Power of Positive
Thinking,24 and, of course, Dale Carnegie's How to Win Friends and
Influence People,25 which has sold over fifteen million copies since its
publication in 1937.26
The relentless American desire for upward mobility can also be
seen in treatises on etiquette from Emily Post27 to Miss Manners.2 8
This desire is not merely a lust for higher social status. The point of
these treatises is not simply to hobnob with one's betters, but, through
careful self-regulation and restraint, to become the very sort of person
who deserves to hobnob.
A similar point applies to the burgeoning literature on American
business strategy, which threatens to consume ever greater shelf space
at the local Barnes & Noble. These books combine mundane wisdom
on how to position products and organize one's phone calls with
quasi-spiritual advice on how to become a better person, to achieve
"personal integration," and to make one's self the best one can be. In
the American mind, to succeed in business is to succeed at life, and to
succeed at life is-as anyone who has read Max Weber can attest-to
prove one is self worthy of success in this world by relentless spiritual
discipline and ambitious self-improvement. The religious element of
American business literature is clear from such books as Norman Vin-
cent Peale's The Power of Positive Thinking29 and Stephen R. Covey's
The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People.30
It is in the spirit of this worthy tradition that we approach Sha-
piro's list of the most-cited law review articles. This list offers a verita-
ble gold mine of implicit advice on how to become widely cited and,
hence, widely successful. 31 At the same time, we think that Shapiro's
study offers valuable hints as well on how to use citations to enhance
23. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, The Autobiography, in BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: THE AUTOBIOGRA-
PHY AND OTHER WRITINGS 15-181 (L. Jesse Lemisch ed., 1961).
24. NORMAN VINCENT PEALE, THE POWER OF POSrIVE THINKING (1952).
25. DALE CARNEGIE, HOW TO WIN FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE (rev. ed. 1981).
26. Id. (front cover).
27. ELIZABETH L. POST, EMILY POST'S ETIQUETrE (15th ed. 1992).
28. JUDITH MARTIN, MISS MANNERS' GUIDE TO EXCRUCIATINGLY CORRECT BEHAVIOR
(1982).
29. PEALE, supra note 24.
30. STEVEN R. COVEY, THE SEVEN HABITS OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PEOPLE (1989).
31. We also think that there is much to be learned from Mark Tushnet and Timothy Lynch's
trailblazing study of the annual Forewords to the Harvard Law Review. See Mark Tushnet &
Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social and Intellectual Inquiry, 11
CONST. COMMENTARY 463 (1995). Their meticulous investigation of the authors and subject
matters of these Forewords offers the careful reader a definitive account of one of the central
icons of status in the American legal academy.
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one's scholarly image. Hence, in the spirit of that great master of self-
improvement, Dale Carnegie, we will consider both how to win cita-
tions and how to influence others by the careful deployment of one's
own citation practices.
In offering advice to the curious about how to become one of the
most-cited members of the legal academy, we are mindful of the wis-
dom of previous American masters of the self-help genre. As giants
like Franklin, Peale, and Carnegie well knew, the secret to success lies
not merely in reshaping one's articles to suit popular tastes, but in
entirely reshaping the self. To win cites and influence people, one
must first become the kind of person to whom such citations and influ-
ence naturally flow. It is with this admonition in mind that we de-
scribe the lessons we have gleaned from a careful study of the most-
cited law review articles of all time. We hope that ambitious law
professors, no matter at what point in their careers, can make use of
the tips we offer here.
Maxim One: (Make sure that you have already) Attend(ed)
Harvard, Yale, or the University of Chicago Law Schools.
Take a look at your law school diploma. Does it say, Harvard,
Yale, or Chicago on it? If so, you have already taken the first step
towards writing a "monster" article, as we say in the trade. Is another
school's name listed? Try to do better next time.
Maxim Two: Publish all of your articles in the Harvard Law
Review, the Yale Law Journal, or the University of Chicago Law
Review.
An amazing number of people have failed to take this advice,
judging from the number of articles that weekly do not appear in one
of these three journals. One can only wonder what these authors can
possibly have been thinking. Shapiro's findings demonstrate conclu-
sively that if you don't publish your article in one of these three princi-
pal journals, your chances of having it cited more than, say, a hundred
times go down drastically. That's not the way to make the all-star
team.
Maxim Three: Take a job as an assistant professor at the Harvard,
Yale, or University of Chicago Law Schools.
You'd be surprised at how many people, faced with offers from
Slippery Rock Law School and the Harvard Law School, turn down
1996]
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the latter and choose the former. Don't do it! Grit your teeth and tell
Bob Clark that you're coming. Sure, the housing costs are higher on
the East Coast, but it's well worth it in terms of the extra citation
counts. Moreover, as you bask in the rosy glow of a fire during a
freezing Boston winter, you can also bask in the glow of those extra
citations. Don't you think it's worth the effort?32
Maxim Four: Triple Threats tend to score; Cinderellas sweep the
floor.
If you follow our first three maxims, you are well prepared for,
although not guaranteed, success in the world of legal citation. Obvi-
ously, there are many examples of "triple threats"-people who went
to Harvard, Yale, or Chicago, teach at one of these three schools, and
publish in their law reviews-who don't appear on Shapiro's lists.
Still, even if these qualifications don't guarantee making the academic
equivalent of the all-star team, they certainly couldn't hurt one's
chances, and not having them definitely does hurt.
Sportswriters covering the NCAA basketball tournament each
March always like to focus on some "Cinderella team" that suppos-
edly proves that any college can hope to compete with the traditional
powerhouses. 33 Every now and then, one of them does upset a power-
house, giving great pleasure to all of life's underdogs. But, we insist,
one shouldn't make a practice of betting on the Cinderellas, because
most of them will get the pumpkin rather than the prince.34
In fact, there are relatively few "Cinderellas" who get the tiara in
the legal academy. The overwhelming number of the 103 articles on
Shapiro's list of the top one hundred (with ties) are published either
by professors at one of the "top-ten" (by conventional opinion) law
schools or in a review published at one of these same law schools.35
Indeed, we have discovered only seven articles, written by six authors,
32. Anyway, once you get highly cited, you'll probably be invited to dozens of conferences
in warm places that will regularly take you away from the Northeast or Chicago (assuming the
airports are open).
33. This no doubt helps to explain the sheer joy this past football season with which North-
western's trip to the 1996 Rose Bowl was received by most sportswriters (and, indeed, most
right-thinking people).
34. As indeed was demonstrated in the 1996 Rose Bowl itself, where the University of
Southern California resoundingly trounced the Evanston upstarts (though ABC's "Nightline"
chose to interview the Northwestern coach and president that night rather than pay homage to
the victorious Trojans of U.S.C.).
35. We will not list the "top-ten" law schools here, not merely out of politeness, but due to
the fact that at least twenty different schools believe themselves to be on this list.
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out of Shapiro's total of 103, that failed to meet at least one of these
two conditions:
13. Marc Galanter (University of Wisconsin Law School), Why the
"Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974).
15. Stewart Macaulay (University of Wisconsin Law School), Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc'y REV. 55 (1963).
19. Henry G. Manne (then at George Washington National Law
Center), Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110 (1965).36
64. William L. Prosser (University of Minnesota), The Fall of the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791
(1966).
65. Marc Galanter (University of Wisconsin), Reading the Land-
scape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).
82. Alan David Freeman (State University of New York at Buf-
falo), Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimina-
tion Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 1049 (1978).
96. Catharine A. MacKinnon (then at University of Minnesota),
Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Juris-
prudence, 8 SIGNs 635 (1983).
Surely the most impressive of these Cinderellas is Marc Galanter,
who managed to make the list twice. He did go to the University of
Chicago, though, which may make him less inspiring to some than the
late Alan Freeman, who managed to make the list even though he
"only" went to NYU. Freeman, though, was smart enough to write
about racial discrimination, a subject of great interest about which
many people write articles in which they can cite many other articles
written on the subject. Galanter's achievement is thus especially strik-
ing when one recognizes that his subject-the structure of the Ameri-
can legal profession-is scarcely one of the "hot topics" within the
legal academy. Indeed, none of the remaining one hundred articles
seems to treat the organized legal profession at all, a point whose sig-
nificance we shall return to presently.
Despite Shapiro's hopeful suggestion that the academy is opening
up to new groups of scholars, very little changes if one looks at the
one hundred most-cited articles from 1981-1991. In addition to
MacKinnon's and Galanter's 1983 articles listed above, there are only
36. We point out, however, that the Journal of Political Economy is published at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, so it is possible that Manne's article should be omitted from the Cinderella
list on jurisdictional grounds.
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six additional articles that weren't published in "top-ten" journals or
by law professors at "top ten" schools at the time of publication:
1. Catharine A. MacKinnon (then at the University of Minnesota),
Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7
SIGNs 515 (1982).
2. Michael S. Moore (then at the University of Southern Califor-
nia), A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
277 (1985).
3. Daniel Farber & Philip P. Frickey (both at the University of
Minnesota), The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV.
873 (1987).
4. William N. Eskridge, Jr. (Georgetown University), The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA. L. REV. 621 (1990).
5. Gary Peller (Georgetown University), Race Consciousness,
1990 DUKE L.J. 758.
6. Richard Delgado (University of Colorado), Campus Antiracism
Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. L. REV. 343
(1991).
Of course, if you think that Georgetown or Duke is in the mythi-
cal "top ten"-tact leads us to avoid mention of the University of
Texas's claim to such status-then the only "Cinderella" articles
would be those of MacKinnon and Moore. Moore gains further Cin-
derella status from the fact that he attended the University of Oregon
Law School, though he did later receive a J.S.D. from the Harvard
Law School. MacKinnon, of course, is a graduate of the Yale Law
School.
Since publication, MacKinnon and Moore have moved to "top-
ten" schools (Michigan and Pennsylvania, respectively); as this Article
went to press, Eskridge had just accepted an offer from Yale. Accord-
ing to informal sociological studies37 it's likely that some of the other
much-cited authors also had opportunities, which they declined, to
move up in the pecking order. But the general trend is clear enough.
One must temper Shapiro's emphasis on the growing importance of
"outsider" perspectives with the sober recognition that few "outsid-
ers"-whatever their citation counts-currently reside in the principal
bastions of the legal academy. The overwhelming majority of students
who are later selected for teaching jobs at elite law schools are trained
at astonishingly few schools. 38 The faculty at these institutions are
thus almost uniquely placed to mold the legal consciousness of future
generations of law students. Few "outsiders" currently enjoy this op-
portunity. This leads, all too naturally, to our next point.
37. Gossip.
38. See supra Maxim One.
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Maxim Five: If you want to get somewhere, it helps to be there
already.
How often has publishing one of the hundred most-cited articles
actually led to an invitation to join one of the Valhallas of the legal
academy? One example might be Arthur Leff's classic article on un-
conscionability, 39 which catapulted him from Washington University
in St. Louis to the hallowed halls of the Yale Law School. Still, as with
Galanter's stunning achievement, one wonders how common such sto-
ries are. In fact, they are relatively infrequent. Our research indicates
that only eleven people who wrote articles on the top list of 103 subse-
quently moved to schools higher up in the traditional pecking order.
40
This is partly due, of course, to the fact that most of the other authors
were already ensconced in elite schools when they wrote their cele-
brated pieces.
The fact that writing much-cited articles does not necessarily re-
sult in upward mobility41 has interesting implications for the hypothe-
sis that citation counts correlate with quality. If publication does not
usually generate opportunities for mobility (including all-important
career moves from the lower half of the "top ten," which train rela-
tively few future teachers, to the top half), this suggests two possibili-
ties. First, there may be no correlation between a highly cited article
by a professor at a non-elite school and the article's merits. This
might be comforting to those whose articles are not on the list. A
second, but more ominous possibility is that there is a correlation-
39. Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code- The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 485 (1967).
40. Here is the list of scholars, with their subsequent movements:
1. Robert Mnookin: from Berkeley to Stanford to Harvard.
2. Daniel R. Fischel (co-author): from Northwestern to Chicago.
3. Lon Fuller (co-author): from Duke to Harvard.
4. Joseph Sax: from Colorado to Michigan to Berkeley.
5. George Fletcher: from UCLA to Columbia.
6. Henry Mongahan: from B.U. to Columbia.
7. Gerald Frug: from Penn to Harvard.
8. Arthur Alan Leff: from Washington University (St. Louis) to Yale.
9. Albert Altschuler: from Texas (actually a visiting fellow at Chicago at the time) to
Chicago.
10. Sanford Kadish: from Utah to Michigan to Berkeley.
11. Catharine MacKinnon: from Minnesota to Michigan.
There are two other cases that might seem to fit within this category, but don't really:
1. John Hart Ely: from Yale to Harvard, then to Stanford. (This is better described
as lateral movement).
2. Bruce Ackerman: from Columbia back to Yale (where he was tenured before
leaving for Columbia).
41. See Tushnet & Lynch, supra note 31, at 469, for a similar observation about the fate of
Harvard Law Review Foreword authors.
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but that it is basically irrelevant to one's prospects for dramatic mobil-
ity. It's probable, after all, that articles by professors at non-elite
schools able to command this amount of attention are pretty good
articles. Unfortunately, lateral hiring practices at the most prestigious
schools may have relatively little to do with merit, or at least the kind
of merit revealed in publishing.
Maxim Six: Write about public law subjects, particularly about
Constitutional law, and especially about the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Once you have been hired as an assistant professor at Harvard,
Yale, or Chicago, your task has only begun. Now you actually have to
write something. 42 You now have to produce something to sell to
others, and, as every student of marketing knows, to sell something
you have to understand your market. Who constitutes the academic
market? Law professors surely. But let's not forget the true gate-
keepers of academic success-that small handful of third-year law stu-
dents known as articles editors, who decide which articles ascend to
Heaven in a chariot of fire and which descend to the Hades of the law
review's trash bin.
Writers are often advised to write about what they know. Since
this would disable most law professors from writing anything at all, we
offer a different suggestion: Write about constitutional law. Over half
(55) of the top 103 articles are about the Constitution in one way or
another.43 Sure, you might make the list writing about labor law or
antitrust, or even evidence. After all, Laurence Tribe did.44 But why
put yourself at such a disadvantage? (Ask yourself how many articles
on evidence Tribe has written since Trial by Mathematics. The man is
no fool.) And, whatever you do, don't write about the legal profes-
sion and its problems. Most of your fellow academics-who, after all,
have consciously rejected a career in the actual practice of law-are
just not interested in what is going on in the legal services industry.
What a snorer!
Of course, you can still go wrong even in constitutional law. You
also have to pick the right subspecialty. Our advice is: stick with the
42. Actually, at Harvard you had to write very little, but that's another story.
43. We count 55 such articles, although there are several others that could be said to deal
with constitutional issues. It's possible that all of the articles are really about constitutional law,
but let's not go down that road.
44. Laurence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
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Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, especially if you blend
your discussion with some of the post-1960 infatuation with "constitu-
tional theory."
If we have one basic piece of advice about topic selection, it's
this: Never confuse what's important in the world outside law schools
with what's important in law reviews. For example, anyone trying to
discern what counts as important constitutional issues simply by look-
ing at Shapiro's list would scarcely know that in this century America
has become an administrative state, unless, that is, one believes that
Richard Stewart said, almost literally, the last word on the matter in
his 1975 classic, The Reformation of American Administrative Law. 45
A more likely conclusion is that most law professors (and articles edi-
tors) think that administrative law is a cure for insomnia. Nor, from
this list of approved topics, would one have the slightest idea that
presidents of the United States regularly involve our country in for-
eign wars with minimal or no consultation with the Congress. John
Ely made Shapiro's list three times with his articles on Roe v. Wade,46
flag desecration, 47 and the role of motivation in constitutional law.48
Then he turned to presidential war-making powers. That was his big
mistake. His superb articles on presidential war-making in Southeast
Asia,49 like the book based on those articles,50 sank without a trace.51
45. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667 (1975).
46. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920 (1975).
47. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Catgorization and Balanc-
ing in First Ammendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975).
48. John Hart Ely, Legislative & Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1205 (1970).
49. See John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) Constitution-
ality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1990); John Hart Ely, The American
War in Indochina Part II: The Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 1093 (1990); John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1379 (1988).
50. JoHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBiLrry (1993). It's possible that Ely's decision to
publish his articles as a book destroyed any chance of high citation counts. Perhaps a similar
decision accounts for the failure of his own Harvard Law Review Foreword, John Hart Ely, The
Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV.
5 (1978), to make the all-time list, given that it was absorbed into JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DisTRusT (1980). Similarly, we expect that Bruce Ackerman's citation count for his Storrs
Lectures will surely suffer as a result of publishing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991).
So perhaps we should add to our list of maxims the following corollary: If you want to make the
lists, publish articles, not books, and don't gather your articles together into books. Of course,
one could also simply prevail upon Shapiro to add citation counts to books in the next incarna-
tion of his citation lists.
51. We exaggerate only slightly. Since its publication in 1993, JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND
RESPONSIBILry (1993), has garnered a grand total of 20 citations (according to a January 1996
LEXIS search we performed). Ely's three articles have been cited (respectively) 32 times (Sup-
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After such success at wowing the masses, Ely's sudden development
of a tin ear is mystifying. Only someone completely out of touch with
the fashions of the academy could have believed that the shift of war-
making power to the presidency in the twentieth century is as interest-
ing or important as flag desecration. 52
In fact, the fate of Ely's articles on war-making powers under-
scores that even true "triple threat" scholars can get totally buried if
they stray too far from the cultural zeitgeist of the moment. If John
Hart Ely-a former Yale and Harvard Professor, a former Dean of
Stanford Law School, and the author of one of the most important
books on constitutional theory in this century- doesn't have the clout
to generate an extensive conversation about the issues raised by presi-
dential Caesarism, who can? Of course, maybe it can all be explained
by the fact that Ely left Harvard for Stanford. Not a good way to
maximize citations, if you ask us.
Maxim Seven: Charity begins at home.
You might think that high citation counts are a sign of widespread
interest in an article. But the real question is who is doing the citing.
And this suggests two important principles for any would-be master of
citation:
(1) Cite yourself, early and often.
(2) Get your friends to cite you whenever you can.
The central point is that under Shapiro's method of counting it's
irrelevant why your article is cited or who cites it, as long as the publi-
cation appears in the Social Science Citation Index.53 Moreover, a
hundred citations in a single work praising an article to the skies count
just as much as a single cite merely mentioning the article or curtly
dismissing it. So cite away. It's true that you'd have to write a hun-
dred and one articles to produce one hundred self-citations to your
pose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1379 (1988)), 12 times
(The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) Constitutionality of the War They Told
Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1990)), and 11 times (The American War in Indochina Part II:
The Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1093 (1990)).
By way of comparison, since 1993, JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) has
been cited 373 times. Fortunately, the University of Miami Law Review has recently devoted an
entire symposium issue to war and responsibility. See Symposium, War and Responsibility: A
Symposium on Congress, the President, and the Authority to Initiate Hostilities, 50 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1 (1995).
52. Gerald Rosenberg has argued that the importance of many of the cases that fascinate
law professors, like Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), is vastly overstated. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991).
But of course, he's a political scientist, so he would say that.
53. See Shapiro, supra note 3, at 755 (explaining methodology).
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first article. But at the margin, self-citation can make all the differ-
ence in the world. The last twenty articles on Shapiro's all time list are
separated by a measly twenty citations (224 to 204). And there are
several articles that are less than a dozen cites away from making the
all-time list. 54 A few cites here and there can make a big difference. 55
We realize that it takes a bit of chutzpah to shamelessly self-cite.
But after a while, you'll get over it. Believe us, many other people in
the legal academy already have.
There are many ways to work self-citations into your
articles.56 You should try as many of them as possible. 57 Don't be
54. For example, Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards, Nihilism and Legal The-
ory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984) (203 citations) needs only one more cite to gain entry into the top one
hundred (actually 104 counting ties). Hey, wait a minute, we just cited him, so he's in! Congratu-
lations, Joe!!!!
55. We're not going to list the articles Singer is now tied with, lest we negate his
achievement.
56. Here are some examples of self-citation:
Sanford Levinson, The Multicultures of Belief and Disbelief, 92 MIcH. L. REV. 1873
(1994) (although this article has nothing whatsoever to do with the subject of the pres-
ent article, this cite still counts for purposes of citation lists); J.M. Balkin, Being Just
With Deconstruction, 3 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 393 (1994) (so does this one); Sanford
Levinson, Constituting Communities Through Words that Bind: Reflections on Loyalty
Oaths, 84 MicH. L. REV. 1440 (1986) (and this one); J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Cultural
Software, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221 (1995) (it's like taking candy from a baby).
57. For example, here we could have gratuitously cited J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Struc-
ture of Legal Thought, 39 RUtTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986) or Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60
TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982), or even J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72
TEX. L. REV. 1771 (1994), and each of these cites would count for purposes of Shapiro's study,
but of course, we wouldn't want to do that, now would we?
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shy;58  in our view,59  self-citation is "an unqualified human
good."60
58. For an example of an article that uses the word "shy," see J.M. Balkin, supra note 2, at
285.
For examples of articles that use the word "don't," see J.M. Balkin, The Constitution as a
Box of Chocolates, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 147, 147 (1995); Sanford Levinson, Identifying the
Compelling State Interest: On "Due Process of Lawmaking" and the Professional Responsibility
of the Public Lawyer, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1035, 1056 (1994); Sanford Levinson, Strategy, Jurispru-
dence, and Certiorari, 79 VA. L. REV. 717, 731 n.75 (1993) (reviewing H.W. PERRY, JR., DECID-
ING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SEITING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1992)); J.M.
Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831, 1849 (1991); Sanford Levinson,
Conversing About Justice, 100 YALE L.J. 1855, 1865 (1991) (reviewing JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUS-
TICE As TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990)); J.M. Balkin,
The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 239 (1990); J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions,
99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1670 n.5 (1990) (reviewing JOHN M. ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION
(1989)); Sanford Levinson, The Adultery Clause of the Ten Commandments, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
719, 719 (1985); Sanford Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know (and What Do They Do With Their
Knowledge)? Comments on Schauer and Moore, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 441, 443 (1985); cf. J.M.
Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869, 870 (1993) (using
related expression "do not").
Of course, almost every article published in English uses the word "be," but we thought you
might like to see a few anyway, so see Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: "Infer-
ior" Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 845 (1993); J.M.
Balkin, The American System of Censorship and Free Expression, in PATTERNS OF CENSORSHIP
AROUND THE WORLD 155, 155 (I. Peleg ed., 1993); J.M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern Constitu-
tionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1966 (1992); Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This
Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (1987) (employing the word "be" in title); J.M. Balkin, Too
Good To Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447. 1447 (1987)
(reviewing WILIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW (1987)) (same).
59. For examples of other articles expressing a view, see J.M. Balkin. Transcendental
Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131 (1994); J.M. Balkin, Understanding
Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105
(1993); Sanford Levinson, Pledging Faith in the Civil Religion; Or, Would You Sign the Constitu-
tion?, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 113 (1987); Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brood-
ing Omnipresence of Proportional Representation.: Why Won't It Go Away, 33 UCLA L. REV.
257 (1985).
For examples of articles expressing a jointly held view, see Jordan Steiker et al., Taking Text,
Intention, and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presiden-
tial Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1995) (written with Sanford Levinson and J.M. Balkin);
Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson, On Academic Freedom and Hypothetical Pools: A Reply to
Alice Kessler-Harris, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1591 (1989); Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson, Aca-
demic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Historians and the Sears Case, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1629
(1988).
60. J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1991) (quoting Mor-
ton Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good? 86 YALE L. REV. 561, 566 (1977)
(quoting E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 266 (1975))) (demonstrating yet another exam-
ple of how to increase the number of self-citations).
For examples of articles we have not yet cited to in this article, see Sanford Levinson, Presi-
dential Elections and Constitutional Stupidities, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 183 (1995); Sanford
Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes
Paulsen and One for his Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373 (1994); Sanford Levinson, Religious Language
and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2061 (1992) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE
AND POWER (1991)); Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on the Posnerian Constitution, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 39 (1987); J.M. Balkin, (A) Just Rhetoric?, 55 MOD. L. REV. 746 (1992) (review-
ing COSTAs DOUZINAS ET AL., POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE (1991)); J.M. Balkin, The Top Ten
Reasons to Be a Legal Pragmatist, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 351 (1991); J.M. Balkin, Ideological
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If you can't generate enough cites from self-citation, prevail on
your friends to cite you in everything they write.61 Of course, it helps
to have friends who are prolific, and it especially helps to have col-
leagues on prolific faculties, who can spread your name widely
through their citations. But this is yet another reason to become an
assistant professor at the University of Chicago.
Friends are usually more than happy to cite you, especially if you
offer to cite them in return. Sometimes, however, they need a bit of
cajoling before doing the right thing. Make your friends feel guilty if
they don't cite you in all of their articles. Tell them how hurt you are
that they are neglecting you and your ideas. If all else fails, accuse
them of insensitivity, plagiarism, or worse. Sure it may strain the
friendship, but aren't the extra cites worth it?62
Drift, in ACTION AND AGENCY (R. Kevelson ed., 1991); J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the
Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613 (1990); J.M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Ap-
proach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119 (1990); J.M. Balkin, Turandot's Victory,
2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 299 (1990); J.M. Balkin, The Domestication of Law and Literature, 14
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 787 (1989) (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (1988));
J.M. Balkin, The Rule of Law as a Source of Constitutional Change, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 21
(1989); J.M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911 (1988) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM (1987)); J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Prac-
tice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987).
Finally, you might even consider creating a boilerplate footnote with all of your previous
articles, which you can simply insert at some point in each new article. For an example of what
such a boilerplate footnote might look like ... well, you get the picture.
61. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Electoral Regulation: Some Comments, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV.
411,415 n.27 (1989) (Levinson citing Balkin); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal
Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 378 n.ll (Balkin citing Levin-
son) (and note as well how this gives us two more self-citations).
Kimberly Fahrbach, an editor of the Chicago-Kent Law Review has correctly reminded us
that "[i]n addition to having your friends cite you, you should have them all cite the same arti-
cle." E-mail from Kimberly Fahrbach, Executive Articles Editor, Chicago-Kent Law Review, to
Sanford Levinson, (April 24, 1996) (on file with authors). As Ms. Fahrbach points out, the more
articles one has written, the less likely it becomes that one's friends will all cite the same article.
To be sure, their citations will fatten one's overall citation count, but such a scattershot approach
will fail mightily in getting any particular article onto Shapiro's lists, which is, after all, the whole
point of the game. In any case, if one is willing to impress upon one's friends the continuing
desire to be cited, it should hardly take much more nerve to mention the particular article that
would be most appropriate.
It also occurs to us that the more friends one has in the legal academy, the greater the
possibilities there are of getting a large number of them to cite a single article all at once-a
phenomenon somewhat akin to the apocryphal story of Mao Tse Tung ordering the entire popu-
lation of China to jump off three foot stools simultaneously in order to precipitate an earthquake
on the other side of the planet. Yet we must temper this observation by the possibility that the
more one kvetches at one's friends for repeated citation, the fewer friends one is likely to retain.
This produces a sort of Laffer curve of friends versus citations. It is also possible that people
who write lots of articles do not have much of a social life, and therefore tend to have fewer
friends anyway. (We might call this the "Get a Life" effect.)
62. As postmodern pragmatists (whatever the hell that means) we are also quite interested
in the semiotics of deliberately failing to cite another person, a case where absence is most
assuredly present. Noncitations fall into two basic types, inadvertent and advertent. Inadvertent
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Maxim Eight: Write articles that law students will want to cite.
Lots of people assume that citation counts are a rough proxy for
the extent of interest in given issues among the professoriate. But
much of the writing that appears in law journals is not by law profes-
sors at all. It is by students. Another large chunk is by assistant
professors writing their tenure pieces; this group is especially signifi-
cant because publication rates tend to drop off drastically after tenure
for the vast majority of professors. Even when we turn to the work of
tenured professors, we still have to consider who really prepared their
footnotes. It's no secret that this is often done by research assistants
or law review editors. Thus, assistant professors and law students are
the two greatest determinants of citation counts, and anyone who
wants to rise in the rankings had better write to attract their attention.
The identity of the citing party is particularly important be-
cause-as we shall argue more fully later-citation has at least as
much to do with making certain semiotic gestures to the audience as
providing an accurate record of an author's own intellectual paths.
This is especially likely to be true of work by students and tenure
pieces written by fearful assistant professors, both of whom may feel
an obligation to indicate familiarity-whether feigned or real-with
noncitations occur when a previous article is on point, but the author of the later work forgets
the article or has never heard of it.
Advertent or deliberate noncitation occurs when the later author knows of a work and
consciously fails to cite it. See supra note 55, where we deliberately don't mention the articles
Joe Singer is now tied with. Don't even ask us what they are: Our lips are sealed.
Although noncitation is usually harmless, at its worst it can act as a kind of silencing insofar
as it leads to "burying" an article by denying it publicity and status, or by decreasing the likeli-
hood that it will be discovered by someone else who uses the nonciting article as a research tool.
And at this point, those who are uncited may very much care if the noncitation is advertent or
inadvertent. One suspects, for example, that most authors feel far more upset about having been
the (presumed) victim of advertent noncitation than of its inadvertent counterpart. See O.W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881) ("even a dog distinguishes being stumbled over and being
kicked"). At this point, of course, we could digress into an extended discussion of intent v. effect
as legal standards, as we have in a few citable articles on this topic, but we won't.
For examples of articles we have deliberately not cited to in this piece, see J.M. Balkin,
Federalism and the Conservative Ideology, 19 URB. LAW. 459 (1987); J.M. Balkin, Taking Ideol-
ogy Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the CLS Critique, 55 UMKC L. REV. 392 (1987); J.M.
Balkin, Learning Nothing and Forgetting Nothing: Richard Epstein and the Takings Clause, 18
URB. LAW. 707 (1986); J.M. Balkin, Ideology and Counter-Ideology from Lochner to Garcia, 54
UMKC L. REV. 175 (1985); Sanford Levinson: Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Expression: Does
it Matter What We Call It?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 767 (1985) (reviewing MARTIN H. REDiSH, FREE-
DOM OF EXPRESSION (1984)); Sanford Levinson, Regulating Campaign Activity: The New Road
to Contradiction?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 939 (1985); Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the
Preferences of Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631; Sanford Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier
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the canonical articles in their particular field.63 This felt obligation
produces a special pressure to cite every well-known article, whether
or not it was genuinely useful in preparing the piece in question. In
fact, the raw number of citations in the average law review article may
actually be a function not of content but of authorial status. Assistant
professors eager to gain notice (and tenure) will tend to write the
longest, most heavily cite-laden pieces, followed by student note writ-
ers at the "top schools," particularly those who hope to enter the
academy someday and thus feel some need to impress members of
future appointments committees. Bringing up the rear will be more
senior professors, who are more likely to publish "think pieces" that
do not require proving-or at least suggesting through citation-that
they are familiar with everything that is "out there" in the data bank
of published articles.64
The tendencies of law students and untenured professors have a
self-reproducing and self-reinforcing quality in constructing the legal
canon. Because both law students and assistant professors have to
demonstrate familiarity with the literature in the field in which they
write, they will tend to cite what they understand to be canonical arti-
cles and standard cites. However, this means that articles that are al-
ready canonical will tend to remain heavily cited. As the New
Testament tells us, to those who have, more shall be given.65
But how can one write a canonical article or standard citation
that will garner the support of assistant professors and law students
around the country? This brings us to our next piece of advice:
Maxim Nine: Write icons, not articles.
If you want to understand how to write the sort of articles that
will get cited incessantly, you first must understand why people cite
63. Your intrepid authors went through Shapiro's list and marked off every article they had
in fact read and every article that they had cited. Although, as expected, there were some arti-
cles that had been read that were uncited, we must also report that there were a few articles that
had been cited even though unread. (We figure our research assistants must have read them,
although that's probably just something they told us .... ) In the language of cyberspace, we
might refer to these unread citations as "virtual readings." We are unable to assess precisely
how often virtual reading occurs in the legal academy because we are much too polite to ask
anyone about his or her own practices in this regard.
64. These articles, we hypothesize, would produce the highest ratios of self- and friend-
citations.
65. As to the last of these, see Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950 (1979). We predict this article has
been cited by many people quite uninterested in family law, its actual subject. These people
have been more likely entranced by the title, useful in all sorts of contexts. How many ways can
you think of to weave "bargaining in the shadow of the law" into a discussion?
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articles. The most obvious reason to cite something is as authority for
a legal proposition one is arguing for. But much legal scholarship is
cited to represent an idea, a movement, or a memorable phrase associ-
ated with one of them. Thus, many citations to legal scholarship, and
particularly to the most canonical pieces of legal scholarship, are cita-
tions to what the article symbolizes rather than acknowledgements of
the truth of what the article says. The most-cited articles are less in-
fluences than icons; they are like colors of paint conveniently dabbed
on the canvas because they are familiar and are easily accessible.
Take for example, Gerald Gunther's famous 1972 Harvard Law
Review article that explained and synthesized "the new equal protec-
tion.' '66 In his first article on legal citology, Shapiro counted it as the
most-cited law review article of all time; it has since slipped to number
three.67 We strongly suspect that a healthy number of its 913 citations
occurred because authors used the phrase "the new equal protection,"
or something similar, and then tried to think of an easily accessible
citation.68 In this sense Gunther's article may primarily serve an
iconic function, rather than as the locale of an argument that actually
helped to generate a future author's ideas about the subject.
We will find much the same phenomenon with respect to the
other members of the top-ten law review articles of all time. Often
these articles get cited because they are useful symbols of important
trends and movements in legal culture. Thus Robert Bork's article on
the First Amendment and neutral principles69 (number seven on the
all-time list) is a standard cite for the wacky notion of a value-free
approach to constitutional understanding, 70 while Duncan Kennedy's
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication71 (number 10 on the
list) is an obvious symbol of critical legal studies and radical legal
66. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1972).
67. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 1549; Shapiro, supra, note 3, at 767.
68. Of course many authors might simply have wanted to repeat the description of strict
scrutiny as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact," Gunther, supra note 66, at 8. Shapiro's selection
of this phrase for inclusion in a dictionary of legal quotations is ample proof of its iconic status.
See THE OXFORD DICrIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTA-MONS 126 (Fred R. Shapiro ed.,
1993).
69. Bork, supra note 4.
70. Or, to be slightly fairer to Bork, his article symbolizes the view that the majority should
get to do whatever it wants, thereby turning our constitutional republic into a de facto parlia-
mentary one. See Sanford Levinson, Parliamentarianism, Progressivism, and 1937: Some Reser-
vations About Professor West's Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 283 (1993) (see also
infra Maxim Seven).
71. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976).
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thought. It's not necessary that the article symbolize something the
author approves of or agrees with; in fact, we assume that these two
particular articles are often cited as symbols of movements or ideas
that authors reject. An even more recent example is Mari Matsuda's
article Considering the Victim's Story,72 one of the few articles arguing
that some racist political speech is not protected by the First Amend-
ment. It has become a convenient symbol of a position largely re-
jected in the legal academy.
Given the connections between citation and iconography, it's not
surprising that the two most-cited articles of all time represent two
central and diametrically opposed visions of the study of law. They
are Ronald Coase's The Problem of Social Cost73 and Herbert Wechs-
ler's Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law. 74 Coase is an
economist who symbolizes the interdisciplinary invasion of law and
the rejection of legal autonomy, while Wechsler is the consummate
insider, the high priest of legal craft, the champion of law's internal
operation and the defender of elite lawyerly standards.75 There is a
delicious irony in the fact that the most-cited law review article of all
time was not written by a lawyer and was not even published in a
traditional student-edited law review. Moreover, the article is not,
strictly speaking, even written about a legal problem, but about a
problem in economic theory, namely, Pigou's theory of economic ex-
ternalities. Finally, the article's economic analysis tends to undermine
the very idea of legal autonomy. Having this be the most-cited law
review article of all time is a little like discovering that the most-cited
passage in the New Testament turns out to be Pontius Pilate's question
"What is truth?" 76
An article's iconic status is improved if it stands for many differ-
ent things to many different people;77 this is particularly true of
72. Man J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
73. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
74. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
75. For rather acerbic comments on Wechsler's status as high priest, see RICHARD A. Pos-
NER, OVERCOMING LAW 70-75, 77-79 (1995).
76. John 18:38.
77. What literary theorists call polysemousness is a great asset for garnering citations (at
least once the work gains some initial fame in the first place). Future scholars can, after all,
always score points by .arguing that a well-known piece has not been properly understood until
now. We suspect that this helps to explain the enduring citability of Holmes's The Path of the
Law, discussed, for example, in Levinson & Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1597, 1647-50 (discussing O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECrED
LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920)); Sanford Levinson, Strolling Down the Path of the Law (and Toward
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Wechsler's Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 7 8 a veri-
table rorschach test of jurisprudence. Wechsler's article simultane-
ously symbolizes a movement (Legal Process), an era (the 50s), a
vision of legal procedure and neutrality as necessary counterweights
to the corrosive skepticism of legal realism, an optimistic belief in the
possibility of principled and apolitical judicial decisionmaking, a rejec-
tion of judicial policy choice, elite resistance to the perceived excesses
of the Warren Court, and finally, the moral failure of liberal law
professors who could not find a way to square their visions of legal
craft with the decision in Brown v. Board of Education.79 Interest-
ingly, the article is almost never cited for what it was originally in-
tended to be-a defense of the principle of judicial review against
Learned Hand's skeptical arguments in his Holmes Lectures of 1951.
Wechsler's article was intended as a moderate defense of judicial
supremacy, and ended up symbolizing almost everything else to later
generations.
Maxim Ten: The Real World? What's that?
Our previous discussion of John Hart Ely's book on presidential
power should serve as a warning to all would-be citation moguls that
the only citations that really count are those by other legal academics.
If it isn't interesting to legal academics, it just isn't interesting. Like
the proverbial tree that falls in the forest, an article that fails to be
cited in law reviews makes no noise whatsoever. We realize that there
are some benighted souls who want to reach other interpretive com-
munities. Some want to be cited by judges and the practicing bar, and
others even want to be cited in the popular press. To all of these
scholars we have only two words of advice: Get real.
Critical Legal Studies?): The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1221, 1228-31
(1991) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990) (discussing
Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), reprinted in OLIVER W.
HOLMES, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 71-89 (Max Lerner ed., 1954)); Sanford
Levinson, National Loyalty, Communalism, and the Professional Identity of Lawyers, 7 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 49, 55-57 (1995) (discussing Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457 (1897)); Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?
24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 354, 363 (1987) (discussing O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in
Collected Legal Papers 167 (1920)) (see supra Maxim Seven).
78. Wechsler, supra note 74.
79. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For more on the background of
Wechsler's article, see Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561
(1988). (We might well have cited this anyway, because it is obviously relevant to our discussion
of Wechsler's article, but it does not hurt that Peller is a friend. We will also read with interest
Professor Peller's footnotes in his future articles. See discussion supra Maxim Seven.)
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Anyone who wants to be cited by the judiciary and the practicing
bar should be writing much more doctrinal, narrowly focused pieces
than most of those found on Shapiro's lists. Conversely, we seriously
doubt that the most-cited articles by judges or practicing attorneys
would look anything like Shapiro's catalogue, especially if we focused
on articles published in the last ten years.80 Of course, it's part of the
same phenomenon that there are fewer and fewer members of the
contemporary academy who define success in terms of judicial
citations.81
It's also pretty likely that Shapiro's lists have virtually no overlap
with the law review articles that are mentioned in the popular press.
One of us (Levinson) has written an article on the Second Amend-
ment that chastised the legal academy for ignoring this provision of
the Bill of Rights and suggested that this amendment may actually
have some relevance to current debates over gun control32 Since the
thesis, after all, is that the Second Amendment doesn't exist in the
legal academy's version of the Constitution, it's not surprising that the
article hasn't garnered a lot of citations in the law reviews. Yet, as one
might expect given the current political climate, the NRA loves it, and
the piece has received a fair amount of attention in the popular press.
In particular, it has been cited in such eminent publications as Ameri-
80. Just imagine the following opinion:
".... And for the reasons stated in Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991), judgment for the plaintiff is affirmed."
Yeah, right.
81. Indeed, it's quite likely that an earlier generation of academics would have gladly traded
ten citations in the Harvard Law Review for one citation in a Supreme Court opinion. If, as we
think, many contemporary academics would find this a bad trade, then this by itself tells us
something important about the contemporary legal academy. Opinions can differ, of course, as
to whether one applauds or laments this discovery. For what has become the canonical (and thus
heavily cited) expression of lament, see Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). Edward's article was
inspired at least in part by his ire at Sanford Levinsion, The Audience for Constitutional Meta-
Theory (or Why, and to Whom, Do I Write the Things I Do?), 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 389 (1992).
For a response to Edwards, see Sanford Levinson, Judge Edwards' Indictment of "Impractical"
Scholars: The Need for a Bill of Particulars, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 2010 (1993) (and see supra Maxim
Seven).
82. Levinson, supra note 17 (although this citation is necessary for purposes of THE BLUE-
BOOK (16th ed. 1996), it is entirely superfluous from the standpoint of increasing citation counts,
since we have already cited it earlier. Too bad.).
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can Rifleman,8 3 and Shotgun News,s4 in addition to lesser lights like
the New York Times,8 5 Washington Post,86 Washington Times,87 The
New Republic,88 and The New York Review of Books.89 Sadly, how-
ever, none of these periodicals form part of the Social Science Citation
Index, and therefore they count for naught in Shapiro's lists.90
CONCLUSION: CITATION AS IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT
In this Article we have tried to discover both how to win cites and
influence people. But the iconic nature of many cites suggests that
high citation counts and high influence do not necessarily go together.
As the cites to Bork, Kennedy, and Matsuda suggest, a large number
of citations may not indicate that the cited author's ideas have influ-
enced the way other academics think. Citations seem to be more a
kind of semiotic gesture to the reader than an accurate record of intel-
lectual influence on the citing author. Sometimes there will be a de-
gree of correlation, particularly in the case of the all-time leader,
Coase's The Problem of Social Cost, which helped found an entirely
new way of analyzing legal rules. But even here it's unclear how often
Coase is simply cited iconically as part of a string citation of law-and-
economics articles or as the dutiful reference for a sentence on the
reciprocity of causation or the importance of transaction cost analysis.
Returning to Gunther's article on equal protection, it is hard to be-
83. See Allen R. Hodgkins III, National Public Radio Attacks Firearms, 138 AM. RIFLEMAN,
Feb. 1990, at 46 (noting purported inability, in January 1990, of National Public Radio to find
any legal scholar who believed that the Second Amendment protected in any way an individual's
right to keep and bear arms, even though Sanford Levinson, The Embarassing Second Amend-
ment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989), which takes such a view seriously, had recently been published).
84. See Neal Knox Report, THE SHOTGUN NEWS, Mar. 1, 1990, at 3. Levinsion is quite sure
that he is the only member of the University of Texas Law School faculty to have been cited in
this particular venue.
85. See Richard Bernstein, The Right to Bear Arms: A Working Definition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 1990, § 3, at 6.
86. See George F. Will, America's Crisis of Gunfire, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1991, at A21.
Will's column is, of course, nationally syndicated, and it was, therefore, reprinted throughout the
country.
87. The Brady Bill and the Bill of Rights, WASH. TIMES, May 8, 1991, at G2 (editorial).
88. See Michael Kinsley, Gun Control Unconstitutional?. NEW REPUBLiC, Feb. 26, 1990, at
4.
89. Where Garry Wills attacked it as "frivolous but influential." See Gerry Wills, To Keep
and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, at 70. For Levinson's response, see Sanford
Levinson, To Keep and Bear Arms: An Exchange, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 16, 1995, at 61. This
raises the age-old question: Is it better to be cited and vilified or to be ignored? From what we
have said above, isn't the answer obvious by now?
90. That is, they do not exist in the relevant Fishian interpretive community. See STANLEY
FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980) (Note that by citing Fish's book instead of some
law review article which makes the same point, we are depriving him of a needed citation, given
Shapiro's methodology. We hope he will forgive us.).
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lieve that this piece is truly four times as influential, in terms of shap-
ing the way people thought about issues, as, say, Jerome Barron's 1967
article Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right,91 which
stimulated a whole new way of conceptualizing the role that mass me-
dia play in the contemporary world.92
If people aren't necessarily revealing which articles have influ-
enced them when they offer citations (for they may never even have
read the articles they cite), what precisely are they doing when they
cite them? To answer this question, we turn to the work of the soci-
ologist Erving Goffman. Goffman devoted his life to studying the var-
ious ways in which persons create their public personae and skillfully
manage the impressions they convey to the world around them.93 Ci-
tations, we think, are often just such a form of public relations or im-
pression management. They are a way of displaying information the
citing author wants to convey about him- or herself, while concealing
other information that would interfere with his or her desired "per-
formance" as a legal scholar. From a public relations perspective, it
may be quite irrelevant what you've actually read-or, much less what
you've genuinely grappled with-, as long as you can successfully cre-
ate the impression that you are the sort of person who is familiar with
the cited work. Just as the insecure dinner-party host can walk into
the wine shop and ask for "the wines most often bought by classy
people," the insecure legal academic-and is this not a redundancy?-
can rarely go wrong by associating him- or herself, even if only
through footnotes, with the articles published by classy people in
classy law reviews. Citations are thus an essential part of the rhetoric
of the law review article. They are not merely forms of evidence or
proof; they also fall under the category of what rhetoricians call the
"ethical appeal"-the demonstration, necessary in every persuasive
speech, that the speaker is the sort of person who can be trusted and
believed. 94
91. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641 (1967).
92. For an illuminating discussion of Barron's article, see the analysis by our good friend
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 245-48 (1991) (and see
supra Maxim Seven).
93. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959);
ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS (1974). You can tell that our motives in citing these books
are pure because, alas, Professor Goffman is now dead and thus unable to cite us in return. On
the other hand, Goffman, like Holmes or Habermas, is a classy cite, so we do hope that you'll
think well of us for associating ourselves with Goffman by claiming to have read his books. (No,
honest, we really did read them. Really. At least one of us did.).




Citations are also a handy way of establishing some measure of
group identity or solidarity. Members of a particular school or ap-
proach often cite each other repeatedly, thus reinforcing each other's
personal sense of self-worth, which, in turn, is a function of the worth
each is deemed to have by others. The psychological benefits of recip-
rocal citation may be particularly important when members of a par-
ticular group view themselves as otherwise marginalized by the larger
academy. Thus, one would predict a great deal of solidaristic citation
by law-and-economics buffs, adherents of critical legal studies, critical
race theory, feminist theory, and other distinctive subcultures. 95 Of
course, if Shapiro is right that these formerly "outsider" groups are
now fully "inside" and even hegemonic, then perhaps someday we will
see beleaguered doctrinalists engaging in reciprocal citation to bolster
their flagging self-esteem.96
Citations can also serve as a form of signaling behavior. People
often look at the citations to see what approach the author employs.
Some people may even be loath to read a work if it uses the "wrong"
citations; for example, if the author cites to Michel Foucault and the
cultural studies literature instead of to James Buchannan and the ra-
tional choice literature, or vice-versa. This may be true even if the
literatures make virtually the same points using different vocabularies.
Citations thus signal to readers that the proffered article is the sort
they ought to be interested in because it is based on the work of peo-
ple they already know and trust. Conversely, citations can have the
opposite and undesirable effect of suggesting that the reader avoid the
article because it relies on sources that are discreditable in that
reader's eyes. In this way, citation practices may exacerbate the sepa-
ration of different approaches, different disciplines, different academic
subcultures, and different research programs. This is just one of the
many ways in which separate "interpretive communities" are created
and maintained. Conversely, a citation practice that involves the self-
95. On citations in (and to) law and economics literature, see William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study. 36 J.L. & ECON. 385
(1993).
96. In this regard, we think that "citology" should be complemented by the "acknowledg-
mentology," the study of the acknowledgments of colleagues and friends in the traditional first
footnote of a law review article. Just as the Central Intelligence Agency learned a lot about the
power struggles within the Kremlin by noting which members of the Politburo watched May Day
parades from the top of Lenin's tomb, we can learn a lot about the ebb and flow of movements
within the legal academy by studying who gets thanked in those first footnotes. Conversely,
from the author's standpoint, thanking a number of famous scholars or judges is a useful tool of
impression management; for it suggests both that important people have taken the time to read
the article and comment upon it, and, moreover that one is sufficiently unafraid to have one's
articles critically examined by such people.
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conscious crossing of different disciplinary boundaries can signal posi-
tively that the author has catholic tastes, interests, and expertise-or
negatively, that the author is a dilettante.
We close this article by noting that although we have offered a
great deal of advice on how to advance one's career through greater
citation counts, our advice is free and is worth precisely what it costs.
We can hardly claim much expertise, for neither of us is on the list of
the most-cited law review articles of all time or even for any year be-
tween 1981-1991. Moreover, we are not even following our own ad-
vice, since we are happily writing this article for the Chicago-Kent
Law Review.97 Indeed, both of us have a disturbing habit of continu-
ally publishing in places other than the journals that promise the
greatest likehihood of high citation counts. Perhaps we have become
co-dependent with law review editors who just aren't right for us if
our goal is maximizing citations. Our persistent inability to act on our
own advice suggests the title for our next work in the genre of self-
help literature: Law professors who love non-elite law reviews too
much.
97. Indeed, this is Levinson's fourth appearance in its pages. See Sanford Levinson, They
Whisper: Reflections on Flags, Monuments, and State Holidays, and the Construction of Social
Meaning in a Multicultural Society, 70 Cu.-KENr L. REV. 1079 (1995); Sanford Levinson, Slavery
in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 68 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 1087 (1993); Sanford Levinson, Con-
stitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 Cm.-KE, L. REV. 131 (1988) (and see supra
Maxim Seven).
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